TikTok manipulation in the Romanian presidential Elections and the aggressive actions of Russia

People waiting before an orange colored ballot box on blue background. Horizontal composition. Election concept.
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The Romanian presidential candidate Calin Georgescu was artificially promoted through extremist and pro-Russian TikTok accounts and ended up in first place in the first tour. How did this happen?

This article is the story of a social and geopolitical experiment that offers valuable insight related to the vulnerability of democracy and how social media could be maliciously used for mass. Yet, personalized and targeted manipulation using AI.

On the evening of December 4th, Romania’s presidential administration published the reports discussed during the CSAT (the Council for Supreme Defence of the Country) convoked by President Klaus Iohannis on November 28th, 2024.

An anonymous candidate wins the elections. How was this possible?

Calin Georgescu was estimated to get about 1% of votes at the beginning of October, but many people, including the author of this article, had no idea who he was! The whole scenario took a massive turn with the support of 25,000 TikTok accounts that had become increasingly active only two weeks before the elections.

The online actions promoting Calin Georgescu have become the 9th most popular trend for video content globally between November 13th and November 26th. How was this possible and how much was spent? The reports offer valuable clues. According to the SRI (The Romanian Intelligence Service) report, one individual paid TikTok influencers about 1 million EUR to influencers promoting Calin Georgescu. That is particularly interesting as the presidential candidate declared having spent zero lei in his campaign for the elections.

Who is this mysterious donor who spent one million EUR to promote Calin Georgescu? The name is now public – Bogdan Peschir, an entrepreneur who owns Digital On-Ramp Solutions, established in Brasov, in 2021.

Before becoming an entrepreneur, Bogdan Peschir worked as a software programmer for two other SMEs from Brasov Globaya Fintech SRL and Bitxatm Technologies, which operate in the field of cryptocurrency and are owned by Gabriel Prodanescu (citizen of South Africa, where he immigrated to 1995. However, nothing related to his way of life would have predicted his actions, and further investigation continues.

Many other influencers contributed to the campaign. How did they end up doing it? One of the methods identified by the Romanian Intelligence was developed through emails. A South African company called FA Agency contacted Romanian influencers and offered them 1000 EUR to distribute certain videos. Many accepted and distributed what proved to be elections-related content. Another method was through a platform for micro-influencers called FameUp, where there was an opportunity for advertisement, which was, in fact, videos promoting Calin Georgescu.

In parallel with Georgescu’s campaign, another significant TikTok campaign supported POT (the Party of Young People), which also supports Calin Georgescu. A report from the MAI (Ministry of Internal Affairs) shows that TikTok did not apply the instructions of the BEC ( Elections Central Office) to mark elections-related content in a specific way.

Other methods were through cyber-attacks. SRI reported 80,000 cyber-attacks targeting Romanian information systems on the day of the elections.

Cui bono? The answer is Russia. Another secret report that was made public this time from SIE (The External Information Service), stated that Russia had tried in Romania a manipulation scheme through social media that was similar to the one previously used in Ukraine before the invasion. President Iohannis stated in a press interview that Romania is a target for hybrid ITC actions from Russia.

According to SIE, Romania is a priority for Russia’s hostile actions, and there was an increased interest in influencing the mood and opinion of Romanian society in the electoral context through targeted propaganda and using emerging technologies such as AI to transmit targeted and customized messages through social media.

The social media-targeted messages were aimed to encourage discontent and provoke emotional reactions in the population.

Moreover, Romanian Intelligence warns that Romania is currently a potential target for hybrid Russian attacks, including cyberattacks, leaks, and hacks, as well as sabotage.

According to the same source, the recent messages were aimed at:

  • Dividing the society on themes such as USA/NATO control over Romania, the threat to the state security, and the support for Ukraine.
  • Discrediting the capacity to reply of NATO and Romania and amplifying the population’s mistrust in the national defence capacity.
  • Eroding the support of the population for the decisions related to the external policy of the state.
  • Highlighting the involvement of Romania in regional conflicts and territorial ambitions related to Ukraine and Moldova.

This was achieved through fake news and targeted messages on social media channels such as TikTok, X, Telegram, Discord, and Facebook.

Conclusion

Even though the presidential authority revealed these reports at the request of several civic organizations, no concrete measures have been taken to date, infuriating many Romanians.

Considering the above and the role of social media and AI in influencing opinion, I believe we need to formulate a set of recommendations such as:

  • Education and awareness.
    • The public should be informed, and the state should offer a realistic narrative that allows citizens to understand the potential implications of technology and how to protect themselves from misinformation and disinformation.
  • Regulation and legislation that safeguards and prevents incredible scenarios like the one above.
  • Further research and monitoring.
    • Technological infrastructures must be analyzed from civic and political perspectives to understand further the potential risks that these might cause to democracy

Finally, election-related legislation must be updated to address the new social media tools that enable targeted and highly individualized manipulation.

Contributor Details

Alina
Vaduva
Doctor, Royal Docks School of Business and Law
University of East London

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